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Summary 
This paper explores the cultural and economic strategies of educated but un/under-employed 
young Muslim men aged between twenty and thirty-four in a village in western Uttar Pradesh, 
north India. Drawing on Connell’s (1987) gender theory, the paper demonstrates how 
economic and political forces shape Muslim young men’s strategies. The paper distinguishes 
between ‘school-educated’ men, some of whom had studied in madrasahs for long periods, and 
the ‘madrasah-educated’. Concentrating on school-educated men, we discuss their perceptions 
of education, and how these relate to their search for a respectable masculinity and what they 
regard as ‘good work’. We also show how uneducated Muslim young men with alternative 
visions of education criticize the strategies of their educated peers. We use this account of 
Muslim young men’s practices to emphasize the value of a culturally-sensitive political 
economy approach to the analysis of threatened masculinities.  
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The effects of liberalisation on employment opportunities are not experienced in a 
similar fashion by all of those in the labour market. Religion, urban-rural residence, region and 
educational achievements are only some of the other identifiers that cross-cut with gender to 
structure whether young people can get the jobs they are seeking, and if not, how they 
respond to such failures. In this paper we explore how Muslim young men in rural north India 
negotiate the educational opportunities available to them – in particular the state-provided 
and/or state-regulated schooling system on the one hand, and madrasahs on the other – and 
how they develop diverse gendered styles as they confront the public world of employment 
and politics.1 We use data from our research in Qaziwala, a village 5 km from Bijnor town, in 
western Uttar Pradesh, north India, to argue that, while education can make many 
contributions to substantive freedoms (Drèze & Sen 1995: 14-15), power and culture mediate 
the role of education plays in young Muslim men’s lives. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four main sections. In the first section we 
situate our work with reference to recent literature on youth cultures and masculinity. The 
next two sections form the empirical core of the paper and deal with Muslim young men’s 
perceptions of education in rural Bijnor district and then with their attempts to acquire 
employment consistent with their sense of themselves as ‘educated men’. The penultimate 
section considers the threat posed by the rise of a vociferous set of ‘uneducated’ young men in 
Qaziwala to the strategies of their educated peers. The conclusions draw out the wider 
relevance of our work for discussion of masculinities in marginalized parts of the world. 
                                                 
1 The Economic and Social Research Council [Grant no. R000238495], the Ford Foundation, and the 
Royal Geographical Society funded the research of all three authors in 2000-02; the Overseas 
Development Administration funded the research of Roger Jeffery and Patricia Jeffery in 1990-91. 
None bears any responsibility for what we have written here. We thank our research assistants, 
Swaleha Begum, Chhaya Sharma, Shaila Rais, and Manjula Sharma, and others who have helped us in 
many ways. 
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Throughout the empirical sections of the paper we blend extended discussion of individual 
young men with wider reflections on our quantitative and qualitative fieldwork in order to 
convey how large-scale social processes cohere to produce human outcomes.  
 
Masculinities in crisis? 
Several recent ethnographies have stressed the importance of gender in shaping young 
people’s practices, but discussion of masculinities in the global south has lagged behind 
analysis of women’s position. Men are present in South Asian ethnography but the gendered 
nature of their behaviour is rarely problematized, and anthropologists have tended to present 
formal models of masculine behaviour that were not analyzed as products of gender power 
(Osella & Osella 2007: 7-9). Recent books on masculinities in Africa (Lindsay & Miescher 
2003), Latin America (Gutmann 2003), and Asia (Chopra et al 2004) focus on the historical 
construction of normative masculinities and relationships between these ideal versions of 
manhood and ‘masculinities in practice’. Drawing on Connell (1987) they investigate how boys 
learn to be men, and how powerful visions of masculinity shape this process. Research in 
South Asia shows that men may align their practices to normative masculinities in certain 
situations – such as job interviews or schoolrooms – but privately act in ways that depart 
substantially from idealized visions of manhood (Osella & Osella 2007). Masculinities are 
ordered in relations of hierarchy and dominance, and specific dominant masculinities 
characterize gender regimes in particular regional and historical contexts. These ‘hegemonic 
masculinities’ are “constructed in relation to various subordinated masculinities as well as in 
relation to women” (Connell 1987: 183).  
In contemporary South Asia we may be witnessing what Connell describes as a ‘crisis 
moment’ (Connell 1987). Several commentators have written of a disappearance of what little 
male adolescence the poor had in India, where rapid economic change and new health threats 
propel many impoverished children directly into paid work and the demands of adult 
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masculinity (Dyson 2007; Nieuwenhuys 1994; Verma & Saraswathi 2002). Young men may be 
forced to assume responsibilities in the home (Osella & Osella 2007: 40) and care for ill 
relatives, while simultaneously rationalizing and resisting their subordination within local 
masculine hierarchies. Connell’s notion of ‘crisis moments’ can also apply to educated 
un/under-employed young men in India, whose experience of youth may often be increasingly 
drawn out over time (Parry 2005). Such men occupy ambivalent positions with reference to 
hegemonic masculinities: by dint of their education they conform to certain visions of 
successful manhood but they cannot assume male breadwinner roles (Osella & Osella 2007). 
Some Hindu young men have reacted to this ambivalence and its attendant threats to their 
sense of gendered competence by engaging in hyper-masculine violence (Hansen 1996), often 
oriented against Muslim minorities, especially Muslim women. Elsewhere, young men have 
responded to their marginalization within casual, short-term labour, for example in East Africa, 
through excessive alcohol consumption and sexual excess (Silberschmidt 2001); or in 
Mozambique and Madagascar by becoming ‘feminized’ in a certain sense (Agadjanian 2004; 
Cole 2005).  
By contrast, the educated young Muslim men we studied in rural north India have 
typically responded to un/under-employment by continuing to search for ‘respectable work’ 
and investing in hegemonic visions of ‘educated’ and ‘civilized’ manhood. Inequalities on the 
basis of religious group membership inflect how these educated un/under-employed young 
men sustain styles of educated, ‘civilized’ manhood and perform urbane masculinities. They 
do so in relation to particular styles of femininity, especially visible when marriages are 
negotiated. We have written elsewhere about how madrasahs prepare Muslim girls for genteel 
adulthoods that complement the masculine practices we discuss here (Jeffery et al 2004, 2008). 
We are especially interested in examining how the particular social, political and 
economic context in which young men live shapes their capacity to navigate specific moments 
of crisis. We examine this issue in part through paying attention to the economic, social and 
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cultural resources available to young men in the face of threats to their life projects. But we 
also seek to ground our analysis of masculinities with reference to issues of temporal change. 
For example, particular cultural practices may ‘work’ for a person during one historical 
moment or stage in a lifestyle, and then become unfamiliar or uncomfortable later (Ferguson 
1999). People sometimes move in and out of specific masculine ‘styles’ over shorter periods, 
according to resources, mood, and context (e.g. Osella & Osella 2007). Thus, analyzed with 
reference to weeks or months, particular collective practices may appear coherent – as fully-
formed identities – yet disappear over a longer time-scale. Conversely, identities that appear 
constant when analyzed over several years may, at a finer level of temporal analysis, be 
exposed as part of a montage of styles. These insights are germane to this paper, which 
examines the difficulties confronting young men in fulfilling visions of an educated 
masculinity that offer, in the short term, a measure of pride and self-respect.  
 
Visions of progress through education: “mainstream” and madrasah schooling 
Twenty-four in 2000 and unmarried, from a moderately well-off Sheikh family, Zamir 
spoke enthusiastically about his skill as a farmer, his involvement in a karate school, and his 
membership of a fitness centre in Bijnor town (for more details, see Jeffrey et al 2008b). He 
said he wanted to become “like the very best heroes” with a strong mind, powerful body and 
pure spirit.i2 Zamir’s restless energy marked him out from many of the other young Qaziwala 
men. His ‘typical day’ gives a sense of his dynamism. Rising at 5 a.m., he ran 8 km, returned to 
milk the family’s buffaloes, then worked on the land, drove and maintained the tractor, 
supervised labourers on the farm, checked on marketing arrangements, and kept accounts. At 
10 a.m., he cycled to Bijnor for a computer class. At noon, he cycled back to Qaziwala to 
continue farming work. At 3 p.m., Zamir returned to Bijnor for karate practice followed by 
                                                 
2 All personal names are pseudonyms. All quotes are taken from our fieldnotes, based on notes taken 
at the time, written up in Hindi within 24 hours and translated by one of the authors.  
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either an English or Advanced Accountancy tutorial, then cycled back to Qaziwala and studied. 
When we checked this ‘typical day’ with him, he grinned and said: ‘You have forgotten one 
thing – I never forget to pray five times a day.’  
Zamir had acquired both religious (dīnī tālīm) and lengthy worldly education (duniyā kī 
parhāī). Whilst his family saw Hindi education as important for salaried employment, for 
reading documents, road signs, and instructions on medicine bottles, religious education was 
the source of morality, manners, and religious good practice. Zamir had attended a 
government primary school at the same time as a madrasah, where he learnt Urdu and 
memorised the Qu’rān Sharīf. But Zamir saw his future in ‘mainstream’ education, and 
completed his schooling at secondary schools and colleges in Bijnor. Yet he could not obtain 
government work, possibly because he neither had the social contacts nor the bribes 
demanded: about Rs. 40,000 [£500] for a police officer, to Rs. 400,000 for the post of District 
Magistrate, he told us. ‘Three things are necessary to get a salaried job: of most importance is 
money, then social contacts, then knowledge’, he said. If he failed to obtain a government post 
he would either work on his family farm or enter business: ‘One of my dreams is to leave the 
village, start a profitable business, and then come back to help Qaziwala. I would build a high 
school for the poor, improve all facilities, banish poverty.’ By the end of 2001, however, 
Zamir had started to explore opportunities in Delhi in embroidery or tailoring work either as 
an apprentice or small-scale entrepreneur.  
Zamir’s family was wealthier than many in Qaziwala, and he played a bigger role in 
farming than most educated young men his age because of his father’s ill-health. Nevertheless, 
his case provides insights into the position and practices of educated Muslim young men in 
Qaziwala more broadly. Like many other Muslim villages, Qaziwala was not well supplied with 
Government schools: a small primary school 500 metres away served two other villages as 
well, and could accommodate only 10 percent of the relevant age-cohort. A large madrasah in 
Begawala, 1 km away, had over 1000 pupils in 2000, and a smaller madrasah was located on the 
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other side of Qaziwala. Small private Hindi-medium schools were established in the vicinity 
(one in Qaziwala itself) in the 1990s. For secondary schooling, children had to travel either 3 
km north to a Government-aided school offering classes from grades 6 to 12 in Mandauli, or 
5 km south to Bijnor town. 3 Forty-five of the 425 Muslim young men in Qaziwala aged 
between twenty and thirty-four in 2000 had passed the Class 8 examination. We distinguish 
these ‘school-educated’ (many of whom, like Zamir, had also studied at a madrasah) from 
sixteen ‘madrasah-educated’ young men who had less ‘Hindi’ schooling (at least five years) but 
had extensive madrasah education. Thirty-two of the 45 school-educated men were from 
households possessing more than 1 hectare of land, eight had less than 1 hectare, and five 
were landless or possessed very small plots. Most of the madrasah-educated Muslims came 
from households possessing more than 1 hectare of land.  
Like Zamir, most of these young men had prolonged their schooling in the distant 
hope of obtaining a government job. None of the 15 or so school-educated young men who 
had applied for a government job had succeeded. Only three had managed to acquire a private 
service job. Some explained their failures away in terms of their lack of the necessary ‘style’ and 
influence, but they also mentioned encountering religious discrimination. By 2002, upper caste 
Hindus in Bijnor commonly labelled school-educated Muslims as ‘Osama types’ or ‘terrorists,’ 
forms of stigma that reduced the chances of obtaining well-paid work in the informal 
economy. The sizeable Muslim middle class in Bijnor created some openings for enterprising 
rural Muslims with good educational qualifications, but such opportunities were scarce relative 
to those for Hindus from similar backgrounds. Even the richest Muslims lacked the social 
connections in local government bureaucracies required to get contracts on development 
projects or jobs in state offices. 
School-educated Muslim young men in Qaziwala valorised education in general, but 
devalued local schools. They recalled their struggles to pass examinations, avoid harsh physical 
                                                 
3 For more details of secondary schooling patterns for Muslims in Bijnor town, see Jeffery et al (2007). 
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beatings, and move from one class to the next, speaking bitterly of the poor teaching aids, 
physical amenities, and absence of conscientious or inspirational teaching. They criticized 
government teachers for their absenteeism and tendency, when they did turn up, to abuse 
pupils and send them on errands. Teachers at the secondary schools also pressurised them 
into taking expensive private classes outside school. Several school-educated Muslims said that 
the schoolteachers discriminated against Muslims by delaying their progress through school 
and singling them out for humiliating punishments.  
Rauf, 30 in 2001, the eldest son in a moderately wealthy Muslim household possessing 
two hectares of land, expressed the most intense frustration. Educated at a private primary 
school and Begawala madrasah and then at Mandauli inter-college, Rauf failed his Class 12 
examinations twice. His father removed Rauf from school to help on the farm. Rauf failed 
two government job interviews in the late 1990s, and then helped his younger brother 
establish a small car repair workshop in Bijnor, but this business failed. In 2001, Rauf was 
farming in Qaziwala. His resentment arose partly from a feeling that his school education 
failed to provide useful skills and knowledge. He complained that his schoolteachers were 
“running a tuition racket” and refused to teach in class, and that facilities in rural schools were 
inferior to urban, English-medium institutions. He hated the gruelling and dirty agricultural 
work he had to do, and mixing with corrupt officials. He spent much time avoiding farming, 
channelling his energy instead into racing pigeons. His parents were appalled at his hobby, and 
made him establish a separate household. His father set Rauf’s share of the household’s 
harvest at just eight per cent. Rauf responded by refusing to work on the household farm. He 
supported himself and his family using money provided by his sympathetic father-in-law.  
Generally, however, the school-educated un/under-employed Muslim young men 
were pragmatic and forward-looking. Zamir’s statement was greeted with many expressions of 
agreement:   
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If we don’t get a salaried job, we just think that it is a matter of fate (nasīb), fate (taqdīr) 
[repeated loudly]! If, after so much study and so much trying, we still fail to get salaried 
work, we become sad and angry. When we sit together, we become frustrated about 
this sometimes; but this frustration only lasts ten or fifteen days. We soon get over 
these types of problems. 
Young school-educated men’s broadly positive orientations partly reflected their 
continued enthusiasm for a vision of progress through education. They typically referred to 
poverty and illiteracy as the forces confining many people to ‘sub-human’ or ‘animal’ lives. 
Despite poor occupational outcomes, these men believed they had benefited from studying 
Hindi and mainstream school subjects. Sometimes they contrasted mainstream schooling with 
Urdu-based, religious education taught within madrasahs, for example saying that madrasahs did 
not provide ‘education’. The majority of school-educated young men referred to the benefits 
of education without specifying a particular type of knowledge or educational regime. For 
them, education in an abstract and ideal sense changes how people converse, move, eat, think 
and make choices in their lives.  
Conversely, a few young madrasah-educated men claimed that only madrasahs could 
provide education in its fullest sense. Feroz, also a madrasah teacher, emphasized that only 
Islamic education instilled equanimity, tolerance, and respect, noting that madrasah students did 
not demonstrate and block roads, which causes problems for upright citizens taking relatives 
to hospital, for example: ‘What kind of learning do you have if you are disrespectful to your 
elders and betters and don’t listen to what they have to say?’ Urdu-based learning instils 
knowledge of correct religious practices, moral (akhlāqī) lives, and civilized manners (adab). 
Indeed, he identified the Qu’rān Sharīf as the locus of both religious and worldly knowledge, 
whereas school-based learning corrupted young people by instilling in them irreligious 
School and/or madrasah education   
 11 
patterns of thought, speech, and action.4  Madrasah-educated young men elaborated on the 
immorality of school education with reference to the linked themes of consumption and time. 
Some claimed that school-educated young men had become indoctrinated into a ‘false view’ of 
time and modernity by becoming embroiled in the pursuit of consumer goods to the neglect 
of reflection on the after-life. Feroz said: 
We don’t want money in the bank or lots of good things in our house. We just think 
that we should be able to eat well and feed our children well. We think about today. 
We don’t think about tomorrow. Allah is the master of tomorrow. We don’t live only 
in this world; we also go to another world. We worry more about that world than 
about this world, [we worry about] where we will go after we die. 
Men like Feroz were not arguing that Muslims should adhere to a former way of life, 
but that they should revitalize religious practices and systems of thought to distinguish 
themselves from the village ‘illiterates’ (anparh) and badly-behaved school-educated men alike. 
But the views of young men like Feroz must be read in context; the majority of madrasah-
educated young men agreed with their school-educated peers that school education offers 
young men confidence, equanimity, and a measure of “polish” (they used the English word).  
 
Maintaining an educated cultural style in manual labour and religious work 
School-educated young men identified several ways to maintain an educated cultural 
style aside from entering white-collar employment. For example, one man told us: 
Not everyone can get jobs in government service and not everyone can do that type of 
work. For this reason, education and employment are completely different things. 
Education is not a means of earning money. Education opens people’s minds and 
                                                 
4 For a useful discussion of the efforts of Muslim educationalists to dissolve the distinction between 
worldly and religious knowledge, see Sikand (2005).  
School and/or madrasah education   
 12 
provides knowledge of good and bad behaviour. There are so many benefits associated 
with education that are not linked to getting a service job.  
Other school-educated Muslim young men explicitly argued that ‘hand work’ was as 
socially necessary as ‘pen-work’. Nonetheless – as ‘educated people’ – it would be 
inappropriate for them to become daily wage labourers (mazdūr). Most had no aversion to 
contact with soil or machinery, but working under the regular supervision of a labour 
contractor and being paid a daily wage – and experiencing delays in payment, and the 
ubiquitous verbal and physical harassment – would be humiliating. Only three of the 45 
school-educated Muslim young men aged between 20 and 34 in 2000 – and none of the 
madrasah educated – were in local daily wage labour. Instead, educated Muslim young men 
tended to enter either farming and artisanal work or religious forms of employment. 
(a) Farming and artisanal work 
Eight of the 45 school-educated Muslim young men in Qaziwala in 2000 came from 
fairly prosperous farming households and had become farmers. The wealthiest families 
ensured that their educated sons did not perform the most gruelling agricultural tasks. Within 
the richest household in Qaziwala, the eldest son, Dilshad, developed a style of ‘gentlemanly 
farming’. Dilshad would pick his way gingerly along field boundaries to avoid damaging his 
expensive Delhi-bought shoes, prodding the ground to check on soil quality and peering 
through dark glasses at the labourers’ progress. Most school-educated young men, however, 
had maintained a close connection with farming throughout their schooling, and few agreed 
with upper-caste Hindu urbanites who imagined agricultural labour as ‘dirty’ and backward.  
In 2000, 20 of the 45 school-educated young men in the village were skilled artisans, in 
work they usually obtained through kinship and friendship connections: five were employed in 
Delhi, four in Bijnor town, four in Kashmir, three in Qaziwala, and four elsewhere. Tailoring, 
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machine embroidery and metalwork accounted for 14. Nine worked under bosses in small 
workshops and eleven were self-employed. After unpaid apprenticeships of between six 
months and two years, artisans could earn between Rs. 2000 and Rs. 6000 a month, compared 
to Rs. 1500 a month available to manual wage labourers in the village. 
Sarfraz’s example highlights key aspects of the artisans’ experiences. Twenty and 
unmarried in 2000, Sarfraz grew up in a landless Muslim household. His father, Imtiaz, who 
sold cloth for a living, had decided to educate his children after observing older educated 
Muslim young men in Qaziwala obtaining government employment. Sarfraz took Classes 1-5 
at the Qaziwala Government primary school whilst also studying Urdu and the Qu’rān Sharīf 
at Begawala madrasah. He then enrolled at a government-aided inter-college in Bijnor for 
Classes 6-10. Sarfraz had failed to obtain low-ranking government employment in Bijnor, 
blaming his lack of social connections or the money to pay bribes. Sarfraz then joined a 
Muslim-run workshop in Bijnor, where he removed dents from cars and painted over the 
repaired bodywork. He was on a one-year, unpaid apprenticeship, and expected to earn Rs. 
3000 a month afterwards. Sarfraz said he derived satisfaction from learning about the vehicles 
he repaired: he hoped to establish his own workshop in the future. Imtiaz had saved Rs. 
50,000 to assist Sarfraz with the Rs. 200,000 required to establish a substantial workshop in 
Bijnor. Although both Imtiaz and Sarfraz expressed their opposition to demanding a dowry, 
Imtiaz appeared to hope that a portion of the remaining Rs. 150,000 would be obtained as 
dowry or a loan from Sarfraz’s future wife’s family. Sarfraz also hoped that his skills might 
provide opportunities to migrate to Delhi or Saudi Arabia. Sarfraz claimed that his education 
enabled him to do better than his uneducated peers: education, he said, allowed him to keep 
accounts, work diligently, and comport himself politely with customers.  
As Sarfraz’s case suggests, educated Muslim young men saw no contradiction between 
being educated and engaging in skilled manual employment. Rather, they associated artisanal 
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work with a type of genteel Islamic masculinity. They spoke of the dexterity, concentration 
and patience required for such work, which they typically considered less arduous and cleaner 
than other forms of manual employment. Some also argued that artisanal work entailed 
devoting their whole bodies to acts of labour and thereby inculcated forms of embodied 
discipline and ‘virtuous toil’. Many also believed that by moving to urban centres to conduct 
skilled artisanal work they could reinforce their status as educated people engaged in ‘progress’. 
Those engaged in skilled craftsmanship would return from Delhi with exciting stories of urban 
life. Some also boasted that their machine embroidery work was of ‘export quality’ and 
destined for foreign markets or that working on embroidery machines was like ‘driving a car 
very fast.’ Stepwise migration, whereby young men would move from Bijnor to Delhi, also 
contributed to the idea of artisanal work as part of a ‘route’ to the ‘modern’, the word they used 
to refer to their lifestyle.  
Sarfraz’s parents also believed that investing in his education had enhanced his 
marriage prospects: education had, they said, improved Sarfraz’s temperament, comportment 
and knowledge, such that he would be an attractive match for the parents of educated young 
women. They hoped that Sarfraz’s future wife would help educate and bring up their future 
grandchildren well, and said that Sarfraz would be married to a relative (rishtedār) rather than 
outsiders because they would know the other party and there could be no trickery.  
The case of Sarfraz also points to the connection that many educated Muslim young 
men made between ‘being educated’ and marrying well. As educated people, they would not 
only be able to marry a beautiful and accomplished young woman but also demonstrate the 
empathy and equanimity required of a good husband. These men rarely worried about their in-
laws becoming frustrated if they failed to find government work, often because they had 
married (or expected to marry) within an extended kinship group. They also claimed that few 
Muslim parents expected young men to enter government work. As one man commented, 
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‘our in-laws realize that it is just a distant hope.’  Others also believed their craft occupations 
might allow them to migrate. Most educated young men channelled their energies into 
obtaining work in Bijnor, Delhi, or Kashmir, where Qaziwala Muslims had been migrating 
since the 1970s, and where they could draw on the social and financial support of friends and 
kin. But because it costs about Rs. 200,000 to negotiate entry into artisanal work in the Middle 
East, and many brokers trick young men, only two educated young men from wealthy 
Qaziwala households had gone abroad for embroidery work. Most men viewed their 
migration as temporary, claiming that they would return to Bijnor to establish their own 
businesses once they had sufficient wealth and experience – as indeed about one-third of the 
previous generation following this trajectory had done. 
 
(b) Religious employment  
One school-educated and three madrasah-educated men – all Sheikhs and from 
relatively wealthy households – aged between 20 and 34 in 2000 had entered religious 
employment as maulvīs (teachers in madrasahs) and one school-educated man taught Urdu on a 
temporary contract in a Government-aided school. Begawala maulvīs had social links to the 
Daru’l `Ulūm seminary in Deoband; they groomed students for the entrance examinations at 
Daru’l `Ulūm and three men had attended this seminary. Zamir’s brother Afroz was planning 
to follow such a career. He had received Hindi education up to Class 8 and Urdu-based 
education at a madrasah close to Bijnor. In 2002, this co-educational institution had roughly 
twenty teachers and 400 students. In addition to studying the Qu’rān Sharīf, Urdu, Farsi and 
Arabic, its pupils could follow the standard UP School Board curriculum, including Hindi and 
English, at a primary and lower secondary school next door run by the same management. 
After showing aptitude for religious education, Afroz and his younger brother moved first to 
Begawala madrasah and then to a boarding madrasah in Delhi, where they followed a strict 
training, paying no fees. In 2001, while preparing for the Deoband seminary examinations, 
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Afroz told us that some school-educated Muslim young men teased peers like him who had 
left mainstream school to train as clerics by stroking long imaginary beards and calling out 
‘Mullah! Mullah!’ Afroz saw nothing shameful about having mainstream qualifications yet still 
wanting to do religious work, which he perceived as a way of becoming reasonably 
prosperous, pursuing opportunities to live and travel outside Bijnor district, and obtaining 
peace of mind (sukūn). 
Most madrasah-educated young men concurred with Afzal that religious work is 
preferable to secular white-collar employment. They contrasted the ‘straight’ system through 
which people obtain positions as clerics with the corruption, religious discrimination, and 
atmosphere of mistrust they encountered in searching for government work. Whereas people 
employed in state positions had to engage in bribery, illegal favouritism, and demeaning forms 
of flattery, madrasah-educated young men found security, independence, and peace of mind in 
religious work. Most madrasah-educated young men perceived religious work a prize obtained 
through conscientious labour and the blessings of Allah, not ‘fallback’ employment to be 
pursued in the absence of secular white-collar work. 
Counter-narratives of ‘uneducated’ men 
The attempts of educated young Muslim men to develop appropriate strategies in 
response to unemployment must be read alongside the ambivalence of uneducated young men 
about the value of education. Of the 425 young men aged between 20 and 34 in Qaziwala in 
2000, 364 (86 per cent) had neither passed the examinations at the end of junior high school 
(eight years of schooling, at age 12-14) nor extended madrasah qualifications.5 Among these 
‘uneducated’ young men, 44 per cent worked as manual wage labourers, 39 per cent were 
skilled artisans, and 16 per cent were in business, mainly cattle trade and butchery. Twenty-
eight per cent of these ‘uneducated’ men had some experience of formal education. A few had 
                                                 
5 These figures differ from those presented in Jeffrey et al. (2008a), which do not include non-residents.  
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chosen to leave formal education, for example because of the difficulty of obtaining white-
collar employment or because they were repeatedly beaten by teachers. But their parents had 
curtailed their studies, either because of the costs involved, or because the young men had 
themselves demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm and/or failed to achieve good results.  
These men had internalized a vision of themselves as ‘illiterate’ (an-parh, ku-parh). They 
typically echoed their educated peers by arguing that education provides key skills, knowledge, 
and civilization.  Influenced by wider narratives celebrating the benefits of education, and 
citing their difficulties in negotiating urban settings without school skills, many uneducated 
young men said they regretted their limited schooling.  
Afzal’s example is illuminating. A twenty-three year old carpenter, Afzal lived with his 
wife and young son. His parents owned no agricultural land and they could not afford to 
educate all their seven sons. They nonetheless encouraged Afzal to attend the Begawala 
madrasah up to Fifth Class and the Mandauli inter-college for a year. But Afzal left school at 
the beginning of Seventh Class, saying that he had learnt very little and was illiterate. He now 
regretted leaving school, citing his inability to read banknotes as an example of how his 
illiteracy exposed him to everyday humiliation. Other uneducated men acknowledged the 
relative competence of educated young men in public settings, and the shame of being unable 
to read English or Hindi. They spoke dejectedly of their failure to obtain educational 
credentials and of the poverty, bad luck, and personal disinterest that had conspired to exclude 
them from formal education. Some said that as uneducated people they were ‘no better than 
animals’, ‘like buffaloes’ or ‘people leaning against a wall’.  
Yet uneducated young men, like their educated peers, were also engaged in a quest for 
respect that often involved shifting between different positions and styles. For example, Afzal 
questioned the idea that he is inevitably ‘inferior’ to educated people, and he bragged about 
the strength he had developed as a carpenter, showed off his biceps, and recounted with glee 
his alleged superiority in physical combat. Afzal contrasted his power and daring with the 
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feebleness and timidity of educated people. Stuck inside, ‘bent over their pen and paper’, he 
said that ‘those book insects’ lose strength and vitality, cannot consume oily or spicy foods, 
cannot work hard for long periods, nor defend themselves or their families. Consistent with 
his vision of macho masculinity, Afzal proudly recalled damaging teachers’ chairs and 
misbehaving during classes. Unlike many others, he was never afraid during the beatings that 
followed. Afzal concluded that ‘the educated are weak and the uneducated are strong.’  
Other uneducated young men ridiculed their better educated peers, referring to them 
in unflattering terms, for example as ‘lost in thought’. They spoke of the educated man’s lack 
of experience and practical knowledge: the ‘foolishness of the educated’. Many affirmed a type 
of rural machismo based on the strength and experience built up within strenuous labour. 
These men commonly said that the educated are incapable of the sustained manual work 
required to be effective farmers. For them, Zamir’s gym work-outs could not compensate for 
his relative remove from the dirty business of ‘soil work’.  
Uneducated young men acknowledged that schooling changes people’s relationship to 
nature. But they believed that this undermined rather than affirmed a young man’s moral stature 
and masculinity. Drawing on local notions of beauty as having a fair soft skin, an uneducated 
man told Craig: ‘If we lived in as much comfort, then we would also become handsome like 
you. But if we didn’t work in the fields then where would the grain come from?’ Some spoke 
of their pride in work with the ‘dust and soil’. Others said that the educated lack the dexterity 
for working with wood, cloth, and metal. Uneducated young men who were artisans in Delhi 
also occasionally ridiculed the failure of educated people to make money: indeed, their own 
withdrawal from secondary school had enabled them to earn substantial amounts from a 
young age, and they returned to the village wearing expensive clothes to taunt their 
‘impoverished’ educated peers.  
Contra Afzal, several young men and some of their parents claimed that illiteracy was 
no disadvantage in daily life: they could negotiate urban settings with confident ease, and were 
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unabashed by their lack of schooling. They emphasized their common sense, practical wisdom, 
and capacity to improvise (jugār) when needing to decipher written texts or make rapid 
calculations. In addition, some contested the notion that literacy and numeracy are only 
available in schools or madrasahs, saying that they had developed ‘oral arithmetic’ (munh-zabānī 
hisāb) and could read road signs through hard work, experience, or games. Such views were 
less common among the uneducated than were ideas of formal education as progress, but they 
constituted an important alternative village discourse. 
Educated young men countered the taunts from the uneducated: even if the educated 
had been unable to acquire salaried employment, at least they had avoided the least attractive 
work. But, uneducated young men observed, the ability of the educated to avoid manual wage 
labour reflected their households’ greater wealth more than the capacity of local educational 
systems to provide skills, knowledge and confidence relevant for entering ‘better’ employment. 
Moreover, many uneducated young men were working in the same types of employment as 
the educated, often more successfully. Educated young men working in farming and artisanal 
work often asserted that their education allowed them to perform their tasks more effectively 
than the uneducated. Some stressed their capacity to practise ‘scientific’ agriculture that the 
uneducated would fail to understand. Others, working as artisans, claimed to have expansive 
social networks from school that left them better placed than unschooled men to advance 
craft careers. These claims may have lacked substance, but they were important in giving the 
educated a sense of their distinction.  
The optimism and relative absence of resentment evident among educated Muslim 
young men suggests that they were mostly successful in countering the threat posed by 
uneducated critics. Their intention to invest heavily in their children’s education also points to 
their confidence in education’s benefits. But they had largely failed to convince other villagers 
of the value of prolonged mainstream schooling. Their failure to obtain better paid or more 
prestigious employment had persuaded many village parents to moderate their views of the 
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benefits of mainstream schooling, increasingly referring to the impossibility of Muslims’ 
obtaining government employment and the consequent irrelevance of investing in secular 
schooling. If all the salaried jobs go to Hindus, and so few young Muslim men with degrees 
have obtained a salaried job, what is the point in studying?   
Such perceptions were already important in limiting the expansion of education in 
Qaziwala in the 1980s and 1990s. But narratives of mainstream schooling as ‘useless’ had 
become more common in the village in the early 2000s. Hindu political mobilization in the 
1990s and early 2000s powerfully influenced the willingness of educated Muslim young men to 
migrate in search of work and complicated their attempts to obtain government or private 
white-collar employment. Many young men felt that they should concentrate on small-scale 
artisanal work locally or on acquiring work as a cleric. Furthermore, the heightening of 
religious communal tension in north India during the 1990s and again since 2001 meant that 
those with religious education who also demonstrated their religious commitment through 
clothing or beards experienced increasing examples of state and private discrimination against 
them in their everyday lives.  
 
Conclusions 
In the face of competing demands upon their meagre resources, and an unpromising 
employment market, many parents planned futures for their sons outside mainstream 
schooling. In addition, Muslim boys themselves were increasingly leaving formal education 
before Eighth Class. Our study shows that, more often than not, higher levels of madrasah and 
mainstream education are not correlated with significantly higher levels of access to economic 
resources. 6  But Muslims were not straightforwardly ‘rejecting’ prolonged mainstream 
schooling as a mode of social mobility in the early 2000s: rather they were ambivalent about 
the purposes of education. They differed markedly in their perceptions of the benefits of 
                                                 
6 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for encouraging us to draw out this point.  
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mainstream schools, and the same people expressed different views on separate occasions, 
even within the same conversation. While such ambivalence is a common feature of people’s 
discussions of education in numerous contexts, the rise of educated un/under-employment 
had leant a particular force to villagers’ sense of uncertainty. 
The cultural and economic strategies of educated Muslim young men in Qaziwala are 
not so very different from those of their educated Hindu peers in rural Bijnor district.7 Many 
school-educated Muslim young men aspired to enter the (mainly Hindu) government 
bureaucracy. Moreover, most Muslim young men responded to their exclusion from 
government employment in the early 1990s and 2000s by reaffirming the value of education. 
They typically possessed economic resources and social connections that allowed them to 
negotiate educated un/under-employment fairly effectively.  Some had fallen back on farming, 
while others drew on social networks linking them to urban co-religionists engaged in artisanal 
work. They redefined farming or skilled artisanal employment as ‘educated work’ and stressed 
how their own education allowed them to perform such occupations better. Still others placed 
greater emphasis on madrasah education and worked as teachers or clerics. Muslim young men 
with a ‘mixed’ education from landowning families, in addition to those exclusively educated 
in madrasahs, were able to capitalize on the existence of religious networks linking Qaziwala’s 
madrasahs to larger Islamic educational institutions. In the context of stable or growing 
demand for madrasah education and increasing investment in madrasahs from outside India, 
religious employment is an important zone of expanding economic opportunity. A sense of 
Muslims as a distinct social group is therefore both imposed ‘from above’ and actively 
cultivated by people in local settings.  
 Parents also faced some pressures to invest more in the education of their sons. Tiny 
numbers of Qaziwala girls were educated to 8th class or beyond in mainstream schooling, but 
girls were increasingly likely to attend a madrasah, often for 5 or more years. While this 
                                                 
7 For more details, see Jeffrey et al (2008a). 
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education did not prepare them for employment (very few were competent in Hindi when 
they left the madasah) they did expect to be married to a man with at least as much education, 
and these men were in short supply in the village. Poorly educated young men found it hard to 
attract a bride from a respectable family.  
Because educated Muslim men constituted only a tiny proportion of the overall cohort 
of young Muslim men in Qaziwala, alternative discourses found ready proponents, 
questioning the resources and moral authority of the educated, and dwelling on the ‘weakness’ 
of the educated and their disconnection from the realities of village life. Educated young men 
could neutralize this threat to their respect, but the alternative narratives were important in 
encouraging some Muslim boys to drop out of school and in leading many parents to reassess 
their approach to educating their children. Rather, than uncovering neat hegemonic and 
oppositional masculinities (Connell, 1987), our study points to the existence of varied styles of 
being successfully male in rural Bijnor district that individual Muslim young men move ‘in’ and 
‘out’ of over time.   
Two broader points emerge from this study. First, our work highlights the central 
importance of ideas of education in the gendered strategies of educated and uneducated young 
men alike (cf. Levinson & Holland 1996). School education acts as a type of leitmotif for a 
particular vision of modern mobility, while madrasah education offers an alternative vision of 
gendered success. Some young men in western UP also emphasize how education can occur 
outside formal institutions, for example through apprenticeships.  
Second, we have shown how political, economic and social forces shape the capacity of 
young men to manage economic liberalization. Young men’s attempts to recover a sense of 
masculine prowess are diverse because they have different aims in life and respond to similar 
pressures in varied ways. Moreover, there are class differences among Muslims in Qaziwala. 
But, on the whole, Muslim young men’s particular type of social capital – especially networks 
of trust based on religion and kinship – do not lead them into ‘mainstream’ employment and 
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their economic capital, in the form of modest agricultural landholdings, provides insufficient 
resources to invest in new forms of off-farm employment. Against this background, most 
educated Muslim young men pursued a strategy of withdrawal which served, in turn, to 
reinforce closed circles of distinction. In emphasizing these points, our paper provides a 
counterpoint to the more discursively-oriented work on gender and masculinity in South Asia. 
Our work highlights a need for a culturally-sensitive political economy approach to an 
understanding of youth masculinities (see also Jeffrey et al., 2008a). Such an approach is 
resolutely attentive both to broader structures of power that shape the choices of rural 
Muslims and to more apparently ‘mundane’ issues related to style, dignity and everyday 
performance.  
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